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Getting Hotter:
How Could China’s Climate Change Policy Trajectory Impact a Post-Kyoto Accord?
Gloria Jean Gong1

Abstract
China’s unprecedented economic growth has given rise to equally rapid increases in
greenhouse gas emissions. China has already ratified the Kyoto and Montreal Protocols, yet
as the international community looks beyond Kyoto, China’s willingness to adhere to binding
emissions standards remains a critical question. This study describes and analyzes the factors
that influence China’s possible participation in a binding greenhouse gas emissions treaty.
Existing international treaty compliance models often overlook China’s own official policies
and stances toward such treaties. This study examines China’s current climate change policy,
historical adjustments of that policy, and potential future trajectory to determine the factors
that would most impact China’s willingness to sign a post-Kyoto climate change. This study
utilizes both English and Chinese-language documents to analyze current Chinese climate
change policies. It describes the historical trajectory of Chinese environmental policy since
1972, tracing the evolution of the “common but differentiated responsibilities” principle and
of the demand for technology transfers and access to international funds. This study also
examines reports from the World Bank, China Council for International Cooperation on
Environment and Development (CCICED) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD), explicating how recommendations from influential organizations
may impact China’s future policy trajectory. Most surprisingly, the conclusion of this study is
that China, while retaining much of its former stance on climate change, is also increasingly
warming to taking bold actions to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.

I. Introduction
China’s recent economic growth and industrial development have been breathtakingly
rapid. These increases in manufacturing and industrial production coupled with growing
consumption and an increased standard of living are inseparably connected to persistent
environmental degradation and rising pollution.
The 2007 Synthesis Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change warns
that “warming of the climate system is unequivocal.”2 The report also estimates that global
greenhouse gas emissions rose 70% since 1970, and that this steep increase in greenhouse
gasses is very likely a major factor in global warming. 3 Climate change threatens to
destabilize ecosystems, weaken food security and precipitate severe water shortages.
International consensus on the threat climate change presents to the global community has
solidified consistently since the early 1990s.
The international community responded with the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol, an international treaty designed to
combat global warming with a system of measuring, emissions caps, and credit trading. By
2008, of Kyoto Protocol signatories, only the United States of America had not and did not
intend to ratify the treaty. Under the Kyoto system, China was classified as a non-Annex I
developing nation and, like other non-Annex I nations, was not required to set emissions caps
on any greenhouse gasses. Rather, developing nations agreed to conduct emissions
1
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measurements and submit regular reports to the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change while developed nations committed to reduce key greenhouse gas emissions
and to provide technology and funding to lesser developed countries (LDCs).4
To China, the lack of binding emissions caps was a vital factor in ratifying the treaty.
Since the 1970s, China has maintained that the right to industrial and economic development
takes precedent over environmental protection, pointing out that developed countries only
reached their current economic levels after passing through an industrial revolution. In
addition, China and other LDCs argue that current levels of greenhouse gasses are
overwhelmingly due to emissions by developed countries, and that forcing LDCs to truncate
their growth to pay for the emissions of the first world is unfair. When criticized for its
skyrocketing carbon emissions rates, China is quick to counter that in terms of emissions per
capita, it still ranks far below the developed world. Table 1 shows China, the US, the largest
emitter, smallest emitter, mean, and median countries on total carbon dioxide emission, per
capita emission, and per US$ GDP emission.
Total CO2

kilotons

Per capita

tons

Per $GDP

kg/$ PPP

~China†

6,251,235

Qatar

62.97

Uzbekistan

2.96

US

5,788,181

US

19.904

China

0.65

China

4,143,494

Mean*

5.7

US

0.56

Mean*

128,214

China

3.216

Mean*

0.5

Median**

7,971

Median**

2.7

Median**

0.33

Kiribati

29

Chad

0.013

Chad

0.01

US, 1st of 195
China, 2nd
*Argentina, 31st
**Mongolia, 97th

US, 7th of 191
China, 85th
*Iran, 62nd
**Syria, 96th

US, 38th of 170
China, 34th
*Mauritania, 45th
**Morocco, 85th

Table 1: Comparison of Total, Per Capita, and Per $GDP CO2 Emissions
† 2006 estimate from the Netherlands Environment Assessment Agency, 8% greater than US
Source: World Bank World Development Indicators 2004

Because of the large carbon intensity gap between developed and developing nations,
China draws extensively on the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities” to
explain its reluctance to reduce emissions. The principle of “common but differentiated
responsibility” outlined in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
refers to assigning to developed countries the responsibility to “take the lead in combating
climate change and the adverse effects thereof.”5
Despite low per capita carbon emissions, China’s burgeoning total emissions attract
ever more international attention and concern. Studies made headlines when they reported
that sometime in 2006, China surpassed the US as the largest emitter of carbon dioxide in the
world, almost 15 years earlier than most research had predicted.6 China’s unfettered CO2
4
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emissions have political as well as environmental implications, and played a major factor in
the US decision not to ratify the Kyoto Protocol. China defends some of its growth by
pointing out that 26% of its carbon emissions are caused by manufacturing goods for the west,
and argues that the west should take responsibility for these “exported emissions.”7
As the effects of climate change grow ever clearer, China itself has begun to
recognize the dire need to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The National Eleventh FiveYear Plan for Environmental Protection released by the Ministry of Environmental Protection
admits with disarming frankness that, “China is facing grim situation [sic] in addressing
climate change with hard tasks.”8 Addressing climate change is an integral part of China’s
sustainable development goals, which are based largely on the United Nation’s Agenda 21
framework. The international community has matched China’s increased environmental
activity with access to funding and technical support. This potential aid combined with
China’s ambition to lead the bloc of emerging economies makes China susceptible to
pressure from the international community over issues of environmental protection.
Yet the debate about emissions cuts remains troubled. A lack of consensus on a postKyoto climate change protocol arises largely from uncertainty about China’s willingness to
participate in a treaty that includes binding emissions caps for LDCs. This study defines five
major factors impacting China’s potential compliance with a future climate change treaty:
economic development, domestic goals, United Nations framework, allocation of
responsibility and international cooperation. It examines these factors in light of China’s
current climate change policy, historical adjustments of that policy, and potential future
trajectory.
II. Background and Literature Review
Deng Xiaoping's 1978 ascension to power after the death of Mao Zedong not only ended the
Cultural Revolution but heralded renewed exchange between China and the world. In sharp
contrast to Mao’s strict isolation from the Western world, China participated more actively in
international economic, cultural, and environmental systems. Under Deng’s liberalizing
influence, China broke from earlier policies of environmental exploitation and initiated its
domestic environmental protection program. The year of Deng's rise to power saw a change
in the constitution recognizing the importance of the environment. In the following year, the
National People's Congress approved China’s first draft law on environmental protection.9
In 1984 China held its second national conference on environmental protection,
established an environmental protection commission and elevated the Environmental
Protection Bureau to the National Environmental Protection Bureau (a status just below
ministerial).10 In the same year, Vaclav Smil’s book The Bad Earth was published, giving the
first comprehensive western overview of China's environmental condition.
When Lester Ross's Environmental Policy in China was published in 1988, Ross
examined influences on China’s interchange with the west over environmental policy
questions, pointing out, among other factors, the continued influence of Soviet policy,
guidance, and ideology. Yet China’s approach to environmental protection began diverging
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from the Soviet model. In 1989 China formally promulgated its first Environmental
Protection Law and granted the National Environmental Protection Bureau independent status
from the Ministry of Urban and Rural Construction.
While rapid industrial growth gave rise to climbing pollution rates, China’s
participation in the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development (the Rio
Convention) marked a new era of environmental participation from the central government.
The inclusion of authors Dasheng Yang and Weiyu Yang in the 1993 international forum on
global warming is representative of China’s advance in environmental expertise.11
1993 also saw the publication of Vaclav Smil’s China's Environmental Crisis, the
follow-up to 1984’s The Bad Earth. During the intervening nine years China had undergone a
massive change. In China’s Environmental Crisis, Smil noted the impact of rapid industrial
development on China’s environment and also wrote at length on the contemporary energy
use trajectory and its implications. Interestingly, Smil presciently predicted China's
impending challenges, writing that:
The worst-case scenario would see an unmistakable onset of relatively rapid warming
during the 1990s translating into substantial CO2 generation cuts in rich countries,
with China becoming the leading producer of the gas before the year 2010, and
finding itself under a mounting international pressure to start cutting its emissions.12
Smil criticized contemporary literature on the Chinese environment, writing that too
much emphasis had been put on language ability resulting in “embarrassingly ignorant
writings on the physical nature of China.”13
The Rio Conference and the 1993 Climate Change Convention opened the door to a
flood of publications addressing China’s participation in international environmental treaties
generally, and the global climate change regime specifically. Barbara Sinkule and Leonard
Ortolano’s book Implementing Environmental Policy in China presents an insightful analysis
of the process of environmental policy formation within China. Using a wealth of Chinese
sources, Sinkule and Ortolano address at length the “san ge fabao” (“three magic weapons”)
of environmental impact assessment, pollutant discharge fees, and the three synchronizations.
Using the metaphor of “implementation games” as a framework for analysis, they also
analyze individual industrial facilities and local environmental protection bureaus.14 Sinkule
and Ortolano’s book is one of a handful that draw heavily on the language and logic of the
Chinese environmental policy apparatus, and their attention yields profound insights into the
process of policy making unique to China.
Council on Foreign Relations member Elizabeth Economy’s The River Runs Black:
The Environmental Challenge of China's Future (2004) also benefits from a deep familiarity
with Chinese sources. Economy draws exhaustively on official documents, statistics and
personal interviews to paint a compelling picture of the founding of the Ministry of
Environmental Protection and China’s environmental regime.
As the field of climate change and sustainable development studies explodes, more
and more scholars with little specific knowledge of China apply their expertise to addressing
China’s environmental policy. In the late 1990’s and early 2000’s, the widespread popularity
11
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of sustainable development and environmental studies resulted in a plethora of comparative
studies that included China.15 Others examined the process of international environmental
treaty-making from a political science standpoint.16 Political science research in this area
often uses game theory models to examine the incentive structures of international treaties or
regimes and is largely based on realist theories of international relations.17 Other studies use
economic tools to assess the impact and efficacy of such incentive structures.18 Scientific
studies assess the environmental impact of existing treaties and policies and predict future
impact. 19 As the complexity of the problem become apparent, many researchers moved
toward an interdisciplinary approach, combining analytical tools from political science,
economics and environmental sciences.20
The intricate models created and utilized by these scholars are valuable resources for
understanding China’s willingness to participate in international environmental treaties and
for predicting its future compliance. While this method of broad comparison greatly increases
our ability to compare China’s actions in relation to other developing countries and in the
context of international models, it invites further China-specific research.
The models are often applied to a wide range of countries and tend not to treat at any
great length the impact of China’s domestic policy on its compliance with international
treaties. One potential reason for this lacuna is a linguistic and cultural barrier. A majority of
the studies published in the West that include China, and even of studies focused primarily on
China, are written by researchers with no apparent background in Chinese. While not an
insurmountable handicap, the inability to directly access the wealth of environmental
information available in Chinese or to understand the cultural context of public statements by
Chinese officials might limit researchers to a superficial understanding of China’s policy
trajectory.
This study analyzes both English and Chinese-language documents in order to
describe current Chinese climate change policies, including the Eleventh Five-Year Plan, the
National Climate Change Plan, and the 2007 Report on the State of the Environment. It also
15
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describes the historical trajectory of Chinese environmental policy since 1972, tracing the
evolution of the “common but differentiated responsibilities” principle and of the demand for
technology transfers and access to international funds. Finally, by inspecting reports from the
World Bank, China Council for International Cooperation on Environment and Development
(CCICED), and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), this
study examines how recommendations from influential organizations could impact China’s
future policy trajectory.
III. Analysis
This study identified the following five elements as currently impacting China’s policy on
climate change: economic development, domestic goals, UN framework, allocation of
responsibility, and international cooperation. The following section describes the current
policy and official stance China takes on each element as well as the historical policy
trajectory since 1972. After describing the historical trajectory and current status of China’s
climate change policy, this study will examine possible future paths by exploring
recommendations made to China by influential policy bodies.
A. Economic Development
Since its modern debut in international diplomacy, China has consistently insisted on a right
to economic development that takes precedence over environmental protection. When China
sent delegates to the 1972 UN Conference on the Human Environment, one of the central
points upon which the delegates insisted was that the international community “assure the
rights of developing countries to develop first and address their environmental challenges one
by one."21 China has reiterated this priority throughout its increased activity in international
environmental exchanges. In a 2008 statement to the United Nations, Bai Yongjie, Counselor
of the Chinese Mission to the UN, said that China would “strive for” a reduction in energy
consumption and pollutant emissions, while maintaining that China’s primary goal was to
double the per capita GDP of the year 2000 by 2010.22
Yet China has gradually shifted its position in regards to the constant primacy of
economic development over environmental protection. In 1990, the chairman of the then
State Environmental Protection Commission, Song Jian, suggested a balance between
environmental protection and economic development, though it would take many years
before Chinese policy gave more than cursory lip-service to the idea of an equal balance.23 At
the Rio Convention, China’s delegation officially stated that “environmental protection can
only be effective when development has been attained.”24
In its section on “Philosophy, Basic Principles and Plan Objectives,” the Eleventh
Five-year Plan for Environmental Protection reiterates the “three transformations” that have
recently become the guiding principles of China’s environmental program. The three
transformations most clearly encapsulate China’s growing commitment to balance
environmental protection with economic growth. The first and second transformations
emphasize a shift away from the current prioritization of economic growth over
environmental protection toward a new standard of equal emphasis. The third transformation
emphasizes a shift from government administration of environmental protection toward a
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“comprehensive application of legal, economic, technical and necessary administrative
methods to address environmental problems.”25
While China is unlikely to relinquish its claims to a right to economic development at
the cost of the environment, it seems increasingly open to recognizing environmental
protection as a top priority. Though this new doctrine signals a substantive shift in
philosophy, there remains a tendency toward internecine conflict between the ministries over
development and environmental protection.
B. Domestic Climate Change Goals
China domestic climate change policy has evolved in response to international programs.
Until the creation of the National Climate Change Program in 2007, China’s domestic climate
change policy was scattered between several policies. This section examines China’s Local
Agenda 21 (1993), National Eleventh Five-year Plan (2007), and National Climate Change
Plan (2007) to illustrate the changes in approach to climate change mitigation and adaptation
since the 1992 Rio Convention.
An aversion to binding carbon emissions caps consistently underlies China’s approach
to climate change policy. China’s greenhouse gas emissions reduction goals are rarely stated
in terms of reduction in total emissions. Rather, in keeping with the continued emphasis on
environmental protection paired with economic growth, goals are most often framed in terms
of China’s carbon intensity (carbon emissions per unit GDP) or of carbon emissions per
capita rather than gross emissions.
China has focused its domestic policy on two key instruments to combat climate
change while promoting development:
1. Research and development that will strengthen basic measurement and
analysis capabilities, developing renewable energy technologies, exploring
carbon capture and sequestration and exploiting alternative energy sources.
2. Increasing efficiency of existing technologies, for example, upgrading current
coal-burning power plants.
In the Initial National Communication on Climate Change to the UNFCCC, China pointed
out that its observation infrastructure is underdeveloped, crippling its ability to accurately
measure key emissions indicators.26 China’s insistence on increased efficiency as a way to
reduce carbon emissions is in line with its determination to continue growth, but also
accurately reflects the fact that upgrading outmoded technology is China’s most accessible
and efficient pathway to reducing greenhouse gas emissions. China’s coal-fired plants often
function with only a fraction of the efficiency of counterparts in the developed world.
According to World Bank estimates, replacing obsolete technology with cleaner-burning,
more efficient technology could reduce China’s carbon dioxide emissions by as much as 40%
by 2030.27
Local Agenda 21: China was the first country to formulate a Local Agenda 21 (LA21)
in response to the United Nations’ Agenda 21 (a framework for international sustainable
development). One of the 19 areas of focus in China’s Agenda 21 is “Protection of the
Atmosphere,” which includes prevention of stratospheric ozone depletion, controlling
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greenhouse gas emissions, and construction of climate change monitoring, forecasting and
service systems.28
LA21 states that “China wishes to bring the emission of greenhouse gases under
control, reduce the growth rate of carbon dioxide emissions, study measures for reducing
emissions of methane and nitrous oxide, maintain and strengthen greenhouse gas sinks.” The
Agenda lays out a framework for combating climate change that includes research,
strengthening the emissions measurement infrastructure and increasing efficiency in energy
production and consumption. Its objectives for reduction of ozone depleting substances (ODS)
focus on research and development activities that will improve the production of ODS
substitutes. LA21 also prioritizes setting “targets for emission levels, in accordance with the
international convention for the control of greenhouse gases” though the Agenda itself gives
little indication of what those emissions levels would be.29
National Eleventh Five-Year Plan: Revealing vestiges of Soviet influence, China’s
central government periodically publishes a five-year plan to outline policy direction. In
2007, in response to the central government’s Eleventh Five-Year Plan, the Ministry of
Environmental Protection (MEP) published the Eleventh Five-Year Plan for Environmental
Protection. The Plan lays out an ambitious list of policies intended to control the emissions of
greenhouse gasses (GHGs), including accelerating development of energy saving
technologies, developing renewable energy, controlling GHG emissions in industrial
production processes and creating carbon sinks through reforestation projects.
In addition, MEP’s Five-Year Plan sets binding targets that are “fragmented [sic] to
each province, autonomous region, and municipality directly under the State Council.” 30
Important to note, these binding targets are imposed on provincial governments by the central
government and in no way indicate that China would agree to binding emissions reductions
targets being placed on it by other, powers such as the United Nations, rather, these standards
merely indicate that China is now prioritizing emissions reduction more so than in the past.
National Climate Change Plan: Signaling a growing commitment to address climate
change, the central government called for the formation of a national climate change
framework. Published in 2007, the 62-page document details China’s plan to mitigate and
adapt to global warming. Key features of China’s National Climate Change Plan (CNCCP)
include its admission of climate change as a “major global issue,” its placement of climate
change within a sustainable development framework, its emphasis on equal treatment of
adaptation and mitigation, and its lack of binding emissions standards.
The CNCCP reaffirms China’s commitment to achieving environmental protection
within a larger framework of economic and social development. In the section on “China’s
Efforts and Achievement in Mitigating Climate Change” the CNCCP outlines the direction of
China’s Climate Change mitigation program including “restructuring the economy,
promoting technology advancement and improving energy efficiency, optimizing energy mix
by developing low-carbon and renewable energy, strengthening laws and regulations, and
policies and measures relevant to addressing climate change.”31 In addition to goals to raise
conservation awareness, encourage climate change research and restructure legal and
economic mechanisms and reduce emissions through technology upgrades, the CNCCP
outlines specific standards on greenhouse gas emissions.
The key standards outlined in the CNCCP include:
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•
•
•
•

increase the proportion of renewable energy (including hydropower) to 10 percent
of the primary energy supply by 2010;
increase extraction of coal bed methane to 10 billion cubic meters;
stabilize nitrous oxide emissions at 2005 levels by 2010;
reduce CO2 emissions through a 20 percent reduction of energy consumption per
unit GDP by 2010.32

Counselor of the Chinese Mission to the UN, Bai Yongjie, in her 2008 address to the
Roundtable on “Environmental Sustainability” of the UN High-level Event on Millennium
Development Goals, said that in addition to doubling the 2005 GDP by 2010, China would
“strive for, as compared with the 2005 level, a 20% reduction in China's per unit GDP energy
consumption, a 10% reduction in main pollutant discharge and a 20% increase in forest
coverage.”33 Ms. Bai’s statement not only clearly defines several of China’s environmental
goals, but also illustrates why China’s domestic treatment of climate change has increasingly
become the subject of international scrutiny.
C. United Nations Framework
China created its domestic climate change policy in response to and reflects the underlying
structure of the UNFCCC. China has repeatedly criticized attempts to circumvent the
UNFCCC, arguing that it should be the main vehicle for addressing climate change. China
has also stressed the importance of delaying binding emissions caps on LDCs until developed
countries have first reduced their carbon emissions.
Since 1992, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change has
remained the international community’s key organ for mitigation of climate change. China’s
compliance with the Kyoto Protocol was greatly influenced by its inclusion as a non-Annex I
country. Under the Kyoto Protocol, China was required to observe and report emissions data
but was not required to reduce emissions of greenhouse gasses.
China has actively participated in UNFCCC activities and has resisted the creation of
alternative treaties by nations dissatisfied with the Kyoto Protocol. At the release of the
National Climate Change Plan, Ma Kai, minister of the Chinese National Development and
Reform Commission, dismissed US President Bush’s formation of the APEC Leader’s
Declaration on Climate Change, Energy Security and Clean Development (the Sydney
Declaration), an alternative declaration to the Kyoto Protocol that contained no emissions
reductions standards for developed countries and reiterated China’s commitment to working
within the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change.34 After meeting with Australian
Prime Minister John Howard to discuss the Sydney Declaration, Hu Jintao announced at a
press conference that he hoped the Sydney Declaration would recognize the UN Framework
Convention on Climate Change as the “main channel” through which the international
community would address climate change.35
Ma Kai also pointed to China’s low greenhouse gas emissions per capita and its status
as a developing nation, arguing that it was "too early, too abrupt and too blunt" for the
international community to impose emissions caps on China. China has also roundly rejected
calls for emissions caps on high-emitting sectors, such as steel-making, labeling them as
specifically antagonist to the interests of developing countries.36
32
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D. Allocation of Responsibility
The principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities” laid out in the UNFCCC is now
a ubiquitous tenet in Chinese environmental policy. The “common but differentiated
responsibilities” principle holds that all members of the international community have a
common responsibility to address the impact of climate change, but that developed nations
are responsible for initiating cuts on GHG emissions. The questions of assignment of
responsibility for environmental degradation arose in China’s interactions with the
international community even under Mao.
Even before Mao's death, China sent delegates to the 1972 United Nations Conference
on the Human Environment (UNCHE) in Stockholm, Sweden. At the UNCHE, Chinese
delegates emphasized ten principles that would be echoed in subsequent documents. One of
the principles was that the international community ought to "assign responsibility to the
superpowers for the destruction of the human environment through their "imperialist"
policies of plunder, aggression, and war” and to “sanction countries that plundered and
destroyed the environment of developing countries."37 Such openly antagonistic language was
rapidly replaced by more diplomatic approaches, though China has not swayed from the
central claim that responsibility for environmental degradation should primarily be assigned
to developed countries. At the Rio Conference in 1992, China’s position stated that "the
developed countries are responsible for global environmental degradation" and that “China
should not talk about its responsibility for global environmental pollution and degradation."38
As the issue of global warming grew in importance, China applied the same policy
stance toward differentiated responsibilities in mitigating climate change. But China, while
remaining firm in the policy that the developed countries should bear the burden of
responsibility for climate change and should be first to cut emissions, has softened its rhetoric
and become more willing to engage. There are no further calls for sanctions on “imperialist”
powers for their “acts of plunder.” Instead, the Eleventh Five-Year Plan assures that in
addition to “adhering to the principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’” China
will:
actively participate in international environmental conventions and WTO environment
and trade negotiations, and safeguard environmental rights & interests of China as
well as developing countries. China will perform its obligations, vigorously promote
the domestic implementation work, accelerate the phasing out of substances that
deplete ozone layer and try its best to control the emissions of greenhouse gases
[sic].39
China’s willingness to engage in cooperative efforts to mitigate climate change does
not mean it has relinquished its stance on assignment of responsibility. In 2008, China and
India became ringleaders of a surprising upset at the G8+5 summit, refusing to support the
G8’s goal to halve carbon emissions by 2050. Instead, the five leading emerging economies
issued a joint statement calling on developed countries to “slash carbon emission levels by
80-95 per cent from 1990 levels.”40
When articulating China's demands of a post-Kyoto climate change treaty, China’s
special representative to the climate change talks, Yu Qingtai said “any final deal must reflect
rich countries' responsibility for gases emitted during production of the many Chinese-made
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goods they consume.” 41 The question of exported emissions rises to the front of the
confrontation between China and other developed countries, with China pointing out that
about 25% of its emissions are for the manufacture of goods exported to the west. China
argues that forcing it to reduce its economic growth because the west has essentially exported
the high-emissions industries to its nation is unfair and that developed nations must also
shoulder responsibility for the emissions of the products they purchase from China.42
The National Climate Change Plan holds “common but differentiated responsibilities”
as one of its guiding principles. In line with this principle, the CNCCP states that “the Parties
included in Annex I to the Convention should take the lead in reducing greenhouse gas
emissions.” It also argues that the first priority for developing countries “with less historical
emission and current low per capita emission [sic]…is to achieve sustainable development.”
The CNCCP firmly declares that “as a developing country, China will stick to its sustainable
development strategy,” essentially signaling an unwillingness to accept emissions caps unit it
reaches its “first and overriding priorities of … sustainable development and poverty
eradication.” Though it makes no mention of a specific emissions reduction standard
developed countries must meet before China will subject itself to emissions cuts, it echoes the
UNFCCC in warning that “ the extent to which developing countries will effectively
implement their commitments under the Convention will depend on the effective
implementation by developed [countries] of their basic commitments.”43
E. International Cooperation
China’s fervent participation in bilateral or multilateral cooperative climate change projects
under the umbrella of UNFCCC structure highlights the powerful role international funding
and technology transfers play in winning China’s compliance. While demands for
international funds and technology transfers to support the transition to environmental
preservation were present since the 1970s, such whole-hearted enthusiasm illustrates China’s
gradual thaw towards submitting itself to external standards in exchange for international
funds.
In 1988 Lester Ross noted the diminishing number of references to Soviet ideology in
Chinese environmental policy and an increased willingness to participate in international
environmental regimes. He wrote, "in contrast to the early 1970s when official spokesmen
trumpeted China's inherent superiority, the tone nowadays is one of serious concern over the
state of the environment, coupled with a search for effective policy."44 In 1989, China signed
and ratified the Montreal Protocol, an amendment to the Vienna Convention that set as its
main goal the depletion of ozone depleting substances (ODS). China’s active participation in
reducing its ODS is an excellent example of effective binding emissions standards.45
In exchange for agreeing to phase out its production and consumption of designated
ODSs, China gained access to the Multilateral Fund, a multi-billion dollar international fund
established to assist developing countries in replacing outdated technologies, measuring and
reporting ODS presence, and otherwise move toward the phase-out goal.
As of 2007, China had received the highest amount of funding of any country drawing
on MLF resources. According to the Multilateral Fund’s Country Programme and
Compliance Summary Sheets, China has been approved to receive $779,788,815 in funds and
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has already received $614,032,859. This puts the price per ton at $3,593 approved funds or
$2,829 disbursed funds.

ODP
ODP
US$
US$
US$ approved US$ disbursed
tonnes
phased
Approved
disbursed
ODP phased
ODP phased
233,100 217,023.6 $779,788,815 $614,032,859
$3,593.11
$2,829.34
Table 2: Funding, Outcomes of China’s Collaboration with the Multilateral Fund

With support from the MLF, China was very successful in reducing its consumption
and production of almost every designated ODS. The goals for emissions reduction of CO2
and other greenhouse gas are noticeably vague in China’s domestic policy documents, but
there are specific goals detailing the goals to completely phase out the use and production of
certain ODSs.46

Figure 1: Comparison of 10th FYP goals with outcomes reported in 11th FYP

A comparison between the Tenth Five-Year Plan goals and achievements with those
under the Montreal Protocol reveals a marked difference. Of the 13 goals listed in the Tenth
Five-Year Plan, China reported meeting only two. Yet it has consistently met the standard
and consumption reduction goals set under the Montreal Protocol (see graph below). Access
to Multilateral Funds, expertise, and technology ensured China’s willingness to comply with
the binding reductions.
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Figure 2: CFC Consumption and Production in tons
Thus two important aspects of international cooperation demanding consideration are
international funds and technology transfer.
International funds: China claims that it is walking the path of development that other
countries did during the Western Industrial Revolution. China insists that it is unfair for
developed nations to expect it to curtail its economic and industrial development because of
their emissions. In response, developed nations have pointed out that by leveraging existing
technologies China can leapfrog the most harmful stages and avoid wreaking the same
environmental havoc. The question of how to pay for the expensive leap in technology has
plagued discussions of development since modern China’s engagement with the west. The
1972 delegation to the UN Conference on the Human Environment put forward the principle
that there be compensation for “any country polluted by another" and asked that the
resolution include plans to "develop an international fund by the industrial countries to
support environmental protection elsewhere."47
At the Rio Convention in 1992, the Chinese delegation stated more directly that "the
developed countries should compensate developing countries for the efforts they undertake to
meet international environmental agreements and should provide environmental technology
and intellectual property at below-market prices." 48 In 1994, NEPA chairman Song Jian
estimated that the international community would need to provide 30-40% of the $4 billion
cost of China’s Local Agenda 21 projects.49
China’s Local Agenda 21 reflects the same sentiment, stating that China will “actively
seek investment from the international community for projects which assist in the slowing of
climate changes,” including coal-fired power plants and other coal-gas projects, hydroelectric
stations, coal methane utilization and reforestation projects.50
China not only exerted pressure on the international community to provide financial
support to developing countries’ environmental protection efforts; once funds were available
to China, the positions switched and the donors were able to leverage their position to
influence China’s environmental protection policy. Ross observed the role economic
considerations played in China’s environmental decisions, noting in 1988 that donor
organizations or governments “insisted on the incorporation of environmental assessments
47
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into project evaluations, and, more importantly, included environmental improvement
projects in their aid programs ... thus making such projects much more viable." 51 Even
projects with primarily economic purpose incorporated requirements for certain
environmental actions, using the hunger for development assistance to convince China to
establish basic monitoring and conservation programs.
One clear example of the impact of funds lies in China’s 2002 ratification of the
Kyoto Protocol. As a non-Annex I signatory, China agreed to measure and submit regular
communications on emissions in China. Under the Kyoto Protocol, China had access to the
Clean Development Mechanism, which offered funds for new carbon reduction technology
development. To date, China has received 52% of the funding from the MLF, more than any
other developing nation.52
Under the umbrella of the UN programs or bilaterally, China has actively engaged
with other nations or bodies on climate change collaborations. In 2008 China launched the
UN-China Climate Change Partnership Framework, a partnership aimed at “supporting
development of post-2012 strategies, strengthening global knowledge sharing and best
practices … and designing adaptation policy frameworks to climate-proof future investments
in less developed areas of China.”53 In 2008 Bai Yongjie also stated to the UN that China
believes environmental difficulties facing the international community “need to be resolved
through enhanced global, regional and bilateral cooperation.”54
Technology transfer from developed nations: An issue closely related to access to
international funds, technology transfer lies at the heart of environmental interactions
between developed nations and China.
As early as 1972 China lobbied for international community to “support the free
transfer of scientific and technical knowledge.”55 The Eleventh Five-Year Plan’s “Priority
Areas for Environmental Science & Technology Innovations “outlines China’s plan to
participate “extensively” in international cooperation. According to the Plan, China hopes to
“consolidate and deepen its environmental cooperation” with key nations, the European
Union and traditional allies, and to find opportunities for environmental collaboration with
neighboring countries. 56 The Plan also states that “the introduction of foreign capitals,
technologies and management experience will help China improve the environmental
protection technology and management level...China will enhance its capacity in self
innovation and actively promote international cooperation and technological transfer that
reduce the emissions of greenhouse gases.” 57 The “Science and Technology Innovations”
section also outlines technology focus areas, including climate change adaptation and
mitigation, population control, biodiversity conservation and biosafety.
China’s special representative for climate change talks told a news agency he was
“gloomy” about discussions on post-Kyoto treaties and cited the perceived failure of western
governments to successfully fulfill their Kyoto obligations of technology transfers. Western
governments point to their inability to mandate the transfer of patented technology, an excuse
Yu and other Chinese officials dismiss. 58 Despite continued debate in the international
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political sphere, international cooperation between China and other nations blossomed after
ratification of the Kyoto Protocol.
In 2005, the European Union and China announced a climate change partnership. The
partnership pledged to work together on collective research projects on climate change
adaptation technologies, agricultural substitutes, and other related topics. The EU- China
Climate Change Partnership also established a new collaboration on clean coal technology.
As part of the collaboration, the United Kingdom has pledged $6.1 million over three years
towards clean coal technology research with China.59 The research focuses on developing
low-carbon emissions power stations and carbon capture and sequestration technologies.
China and Australia have also signed a deal as part of a plan to cut power stations’ CO2
emissions to test a post-combustion capture (PCC) pilot plant in Beijing.60
China has actively sought funding and technology transfers on a variety of projects,
ranging from carbon trading to adaptation. Using United Nations funds provided under the
Millennium Development Goals, China launched two carbon-trading programs in 2007, and a
carbon trading exchange in Beijing, the first outside of Europe and the US.61 A further $1.7
million of funding will go to 12 western Chinese regions to help facilitate carbon trading.
Norway and the UN also provided $2.4 million of funds and technology for climate change
adaptation and mitigation programs in some of China’s most vulnerable ecosystems. The
project will target both delicate and high-emissions areas, including Ningxia, Qinghai, Tibet,
Hebei, Inner Mongolia, Liaoning and Shanxi.62 Under the World Bank's Umbrella Carbon
Facility and the Kyoto Protocol's Clean Development Mechanism, Asian and European
companies are paying US$1 billion to help cut Chinese greenhouse gas emissions.63
Such collaborative projects lay the groundwork for China’s future climate change
policy trajectory.
IV. Future Trajectory
The previous section addressed the historical trajectory and current status of China’s climate
change policy. Together they give good indication of where China’s policy stands and why.
Another way of predicting possible future paths China may take is to look at the
recommendations made by highly influential bodies. This section examines recommendations
made to China’s central government by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development, the World Bank and the China Council for International Cooperation on
Environment and Development. In general, the organizations promote increased participation
in international environmental protection cooperation, especially encouraging access to
international funding. They also emphasize the importance of technology innovation and
modernization.
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) continued its
decade-long work with SEPA with the first Environmental Performance Review of China in
2007. In the resulting report, the OECD outlined recommendations, including methods to
address China’s international cooperation. The recommendations all emphasize strengthening
China’s participation in international environmental co-operation, and include continuing
China’s “active engagement”, strengthening infrastructure capabilities “in support of the
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implementation of international commitments,” developing partnerships with foreign
enterprises and improving efficacy and use of “international support mechanisms” such as the
Multilateral Fund, the World Bank’s Clean Development Fund, and other similar funding
mechanisms.
The core of the OECD’s recommendation is active engagement in international
environmental co-operation. As part of this engagement, the OECD has urged China to meet
all the requirements of the Montreal Protocol for reduction of ODSs within the appointed
timeframe. Although the OECD does not ultimately determine China’s climate change
policy, inasmuch as the OECD does wield influence, its recommendations can still indicate
possible future climate change policy for China. If China engaged as fully as the OECD
suggests, the international community’s influence in China’s domestic policy could be
expected to grow significantly. Even the recommendation that China develop partnerships
with foreign enterprises to receive “training, technical support and cleaner technology”
implies a willingness to conform to the environmental requirements of foreign firms. If
China implemented all the recommendations of the OECD, it would proactively adjust
internal standards and processes to ensure international compatibility and would, in turn,
benefit greatly from the resulting access to funds.
Recommendations from the World Bank follow a similar vein of thought, with a
predictable emphasis on market forces. The World Bank Report China: Air, Land, Water
points to structural changes and technology innovations emerging from “successful economic
reforms” as the key to future reductions of greenhouse gasses.64 China’s accession to the
World Trade Organization, the report posits, will speed these economic reforms. The report
also calls for relying on pricing and regulatory measures to improve the quality of coal,
countering greater demand for automobiles with increased fuel efficiency, and improving
building energy efficiency. Additionally, the report recommends that China “explore new
ways to tap into international capital, knowledge, and technology” to address environmental
challenges. The report specifically urges that these gains in capital, knowledge and
technology should be applied toward an aggressive alternative energy development program.
Reducing China’s coal dependence is so vital, the report claims, that China may not be able
to rely solely on market forces, but may require additional government support.65
Established in 1992, the China Council for International Cooperation on Environment
and Development (CCICED) is an advisory body made up of international experts and highlevel Chinese officials, many of whom are ministers or vice-ministers of the main
departments. The CCICED submits its reports directly to the highest levels of Chinese
government. Current Premier Wen Jiabao was former chairperson of the CCICED; the
current chairperson is the Vice Premier of the State Council, Li Keqiang. Among the
CCICED’s stated objectives are providing “advice, policy recommendations and early policy
warnings to the Chinese Government” and acting in an advisory capacity to the Chinese
Government on important environmental and developmental decisions.66 Recommendations
from the CCICED range from short-term pragmatic solutions to long-term policy principles.
The 2005 CCICED Annual General Meeting on “Sustainable Urbanization” suggested
that climate change mitigation and adaptation be addressed at the planning stages of
development in order to address predicted changes in rainfall, temperature and sea level.
Suggestions also focused on the modernization of coal utilization as part of a national
strategy to form a sustainable energy system. Interestingly, the report noted both the cost of
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delaying reduction of greenhouse gas emissions and the fact that planned investments into
electricity would further solidify China’s commitment to coal use.67
In 2003 the CCICED wrote, “China can build for its future, not simply retrofit the
past—the very expensive route of already-industrialized countries.”68 This ambitious ideal is
tempered by the acknowledgment that “the challenge of creating a sustainable national
economy on the scale of China’s is unprecedented. There is no existing model to draw
upon…”69 To face this challenge, the committee members wrote, “will require a singularly
strong will, more financial resources, and great ingenuity.”
The CCICED, like the World Bank and the OECD, envisions China expanding its role
in the international community. This vision took more concrete form during the 2008 Annual
General Meeting on “Innovation for a Harmonious Development” in which the members
discussed the possibility for China to become a world leader in green technologies.
Referencing the challenge of climate change, CCICED Chairperson Li Keqiang declared that
“even with a slowing economy, no country can relent in the struggle.”70 To meet China's
GHG emission reduction standards and long-term sustainable development goals, the
committee recommended that future policy, including the Twelfth Five-Year Plan, focus in
part on developing a Low Carbon Economy. 71 The Task Force on Energy Efficiency and
Urban Development noted that “China is well positioned to play a lead role in the new clean
technologies sector ... including clean transport, solar power, wind power, geothermal
systems nuclear power systems, carbon capture and sequestration, clean coal etc.” Though
currently reflected only in a few levels of government, this viewpoint envisions shifting
China's position from a recipient of technology transfers to a world leader in clean
technology.72 In order to realize this vision, the CCICED focuses heavily on the support of
technology research and innovation, suggesting the creation of several national-level
information networks and organizations to encourage innovation.
The Task Force on Innovation and Environmentally-Friendly Society linked China's
ability to lead the world in clean technology with an ability to reduce emissions. The Task
Force unexpectedly suggests that, while China's current goals of reduction in emissions
intensity are worthwhile, “it is time to look at absolute pollution reduction, not just intensity
reduction…”73 During General Debate some members cited the Innovations Task Force in
recommending the creation energy-intensity based mechanisms to complement the CDM and
suggested that China "could play a role in championing this view as we move towards a new
global climate."74 While the recommendations put forward by the CCICED do not guarantee
the direction of future policy, they do indicate broad topics in which the central government
is most invested. According to the CCICED reports, China's policy future is one that
supports a Low Carbon Economy, highly encourages innovation and leadership in clean
technologies, and is open to considering absolute emissions cuts in addition to reductions in
emissions intensity.
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V. Conclusion
In their monograph “Overcoming Obstacles to U.S.-China Cooperation on Climate Change,”
Kenneth Lieberthal and David Sandalow make nine recommendations to senior leadership on
ways to facilitate post-Kyoto negotiations. The first recommendation is for both parties to
acknowledge the legitimacy of each other’s perspective. Lieberthal and Sandalow write that
fundamental divisions between the US and China perspective remain significant, arguing that
if the United States and China, as the world’s major industrialized country and largest
developing country, can start by recognizing and accepting different perspectives, and
proceeding from there to constructive action, it could reduce obstacles to developing
more widespread multilateral agreements. Including such an approach on U.S.-China
bilateral agreements on climate change and clean energy could contribute to shaping
post-Kyoto agreements to control greenhouse gas emissions globally.75
The importance of acknowledging the legitimacy of each party’s viewpoint can be
extended to the international community as well. This study, by describing the historical
context and current status of China’s climate change policy, facilitates understanding by
framing China’s perspective on climate change. As China jockeys into position to play a
leading role in the international community throughout the next century, an understanding of
the historical trajectory, current stance and possible future paths of China’s climate change
policy grants important insight into its approach to a post-Kyoto climate change protocol.
At an APEC meeting in 2007, Chinese President Hu Jintao succinctly summarized the
following four principles of China's climate change stance: address climate change through
cooperation, pursue sustainable development, uphold the UNFCCC as the main channel for
addressing climate change, and “adhere to scientific and technological innovation.” 76 The
following points examine President Hu's statement in the light of the historical trajectory of
China's climate change policy to predict what China is willing and is not willing to sign and
enact in a post-Kyoto accord.
1. Address climate change through cooperation. This includes the responsibility of
developed countries to “continue taking the lead in reducing emissions after 2012.”
Consistent since 1972, China has and does insist that developed countries reduce their
emissions first. The National Climate Change Plan and other policies uphold China's
commitment to the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities.”77 A numerical
standard of emissions reductions expected of developed countries is rarely named, though
some statements have insisted that developed countries reduce emissions down to 40-95% of
1990 levels. As for addressing climate change through cooperation, China's commitment to
working within the established international framework has strengthened considerably since
the 1970s. This stronger commitment should play a factor in any post-Kyoto treaties, since
China will be more eager than ever to take a major role as a leader in the developing world.
2. Pursue sustainable development. For a long time, China insisted on the right of
LDCs to economic development at the cost of the environment. This stance has shifted
dramatically, with China now giving equal weight to environmental protection, at least in
theory. While actual practice appears to lag behind this ideal, China is clearly making
sustainable development a priority. It is important to note, however, that while China may be
willing to impose restrictive domestic standards if it sees fit, it will be less likely to accept
external caps on emissions that would severely retard economic growth. Thus, a post-Kyoto
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treaty that defines caps and cuts in terms of carbon intensity or per capita emissions for nonAnnex I nations would be much more palatable to China than one that defined them in terms
of total emissions. For example, a treaty that required a 4% annual decrease in energy
intensity per GDP unit would be in line with China’s current domestic goals.
3. Uphold the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol as the “core mechanism and
main channel for addressing climate change.” Repeatedly rejecting treaties proposed
outside of the UN framework, China has demonstrated its determination to work within the
UNFCCC structure. The funding and technology transfer organs of the Kyoto Protocol have
proved beneficial to China and lower the cost of making the transfer to more efficient
technologies. The example of China’s success in reducing ozone depleting substances under
the Montreal Protocol raises an intriguing example of the efficacy of international funds in
providing a powerful incentive to change production and consumption patterns. To merit
China’s support, a post-Kyoto protocol almost inevitably must be built upon the foundation
of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, including a continuation of existing international
funds (e.g., the Clean Development Mechanism).
4. Science and technology innovation. China has turned to science and technology
innovations as the key solution to reducing greenhouse gas emissions and increasing energy
efficiency, continuing its request of technology transfers from the developed world. While the
smooth transfer of technology has been interrupted by concerns over intellectual property
rights, patent violation, potential military use and economic competition, China has already
actively engaged in many bilateral and multilateral technology development projects. As such,
China will likely require commitments by developed countries to provide services, funds and
technology transfers to developed countries as a fundamental part of any post-Kyoto accord.
It is important to note that negotiation and ratification of any post-Kyoto treaty will be
the beginning rather than the end of China’s post-2012 climate change policy. Even after
successful ratification, China will still face significant implementation challenges; lack of
coordination between ministries, a growing sector of small to medium size enterprises and
strong local protectionism present serious threats to China’s ability to implement effective
environmental policy. Jared Diamond and Jingguo Liu reported in their article “China’s
Environment in a Globalizing World” that township and village enterprises (TVEs) account
for a third of Chinese production and half of its exports. TVEs, which average six workers,
account for a disproportionate percentage of China’s pollution. TVEs may often use highpolluting outdated technologies or unsafe chemical disposal practices, yet the small size of
TVEs make them relatively difficult to regulate.78 (1180)
Though policy-makers form increasingly sophisticated statutes, Chinese regulatory
laws are famously vague in their stipulations. The Eleventh Five-Year Plan for
Environmental Protection, for example, determines the direction of relevant policies and
announces certain goals and central programs, yet leaves specific standards and
implementation policies up to local governments. Unfortunately, the vagueness of the
national laws leaves room for manipulation or even for contradictory local laws that create a
legal space for industry to continue high-emitting practices.
Implementation at regional levels often runs headlong into local protectionism, one of
the most daunting challenges facing environmental protection in China. Under pressure to
grow their GDPs local governments often privilege industrial development over
environmental protection, despite national or even local regulations. Government structure
also inhibits effective environmental protection. Distribution of authority, incentive structures
and the limits of the central government’s power limit the power of the Ministry of
Environmental Protection and of local environmental protection bureaus in pursuing effective
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regulation. For example, Lieberthal notes that, “given the line of authority and incentives in
China, the entrepreneurs (local territorial officials) typically control the regulators (local
environmental officials).” 79 This study recommends further investigation of the impact of
these challenges on China’s ability to implement a post-Kyoto climate change treaty.
China’s willingness to agree to mitigation and adaptation policy stipulations will most
likely be affected by its ability to carry out the commitments it makes. China has ambitions to
become the recognized leader of the developing world and to increase its influence in the
international political sphere. One of the recurring phrases China uses to describe itself is a
负责任的发展中国家 (fuzeren de fazhanzhong guojia)—a responsible developing country,
In negotiations on a climate change treaty, China will push for the inclusion of attainable
standards that allow it to build its credibility as a responsible developing country. What
standards are “attainable” for China? Answering that question is well beyond the scope of
this study, but China’s determination to seek attainable standards explain in part its eagerness
for technology transfers and funding. Funding and technology provided by the international
community lowers the cost of implementation to China, making successful regulation more
possible. Thus, the level of control to which China is willing to submit may be closely related
to the amount of funding made available and the level of commitment from developed
countries to transfer technology.
As the global community responds to increasingly urgent calls to action on climate
change, mutual understanding will be critical in achieving consensus. China will play a key
role in negotiating a successful post-Kyoto climate change accord, and a historically
grounded description of China’s policy trajectory provides the perspective necessary to
predict China’s stance on any number of post-Kyoto accord iterations.
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